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Present study gives an insight into the reactions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) as it reacted upon the overall and deep political changes that took place 
in 1988 and 1989 throughout Eastern Europe. While surveying the course of events, 
which depended to a large extent on the overall political situation in the USSR, the 
paper gives us an exciting insight into the documents (confidential situation reports, 
expert evaluations, political predictions, etc.) produced by experts in the inner circles 
of the major Western political and military alliance and the North Atlantic Council. In 
order to understand the meaning and circumstances how was the transformation of 
Eastern Europe as the result of the collapse of communism perceived by NATO offi-
cials, the author analyses the period right after the radical change in the policies of 
NATO as approaching the end of the Cold War.
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NATO: Its Principles, Structure, and Operation in 1989
NATO is a political and military alliance that was established on April 4, 1949 with 
the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty (also referred to as the Washington Trea-
ty). It was intended to function as a counterweight to the Soviet army deployed in 
Central and Eastern Europe after the Second World War. The founding members 
were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Neth-
erlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 1952 
Greece and Turkey joined the alliance, in 1955 West Germany, and in 1982 Spain 
also became a member. In 1966 France left the military organization of NATO, but 
remained a member of the political alliance.
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states:  The Parties agree that an armed 
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be con-
1 This article is an edited version of the Introduction chapter of Gusztáv Kecskés’s recent book, A view 
from Brussels. Secret NATO reports about the Eastern European Transition, 1988–1991. Cold 
War History Research Center – Research Centre for the Humanites, Budapest, 2019, pp. 11–36.
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sidered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such 
an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, indivi-
dually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, 
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the 
North Atlantic area. (The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949) Article 5 also regulates the 
geographical scope of the treaty: armed attack against one or more of them 
in Europe or North America. Other paragraphs of the Treaty identify other basic 
principles, like the strengthening of democracy, the development of joint military 
capacities and capabilities, and consultation between the members.
The primary aim of NATO during the Cold War was to unify and strengthen the 
military response of the western alliance in the case of an attack on Western Eu-
rope by the Soviet Union and its allies.2
NATO consists of sovereign countries, which preserve their independence in 
foreign as well as domestic policy. According to the founding documents all mem-
bers have equal rights and possibilities to express their views through public fo-
rums of the organization regardless of the size, population, or political influence of 
the country. Decisions are achieved by consensus and not by majority vote. This 
implies that all decisions should enjoy the full support of all member states and 
express the mutual decision of all sovereign member states. To achieve close po-
litical cooperation, the member states undertake to inform one another about the 
goals of their foreign policies and about their changing views with regard to each 
issue that arises. (See The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 1989, 185 which 
provides information on the structure and operating principles of NATO.)
Pursuant to Article 9, the governments of the member states established the 
NAC (North Atlantic Council), in which each government is represented. This is the 
highest political decision making forum of the organization, whose task is to realize 
the aims laid down in the treaty. This is the only organization created directly by 
the Treaty with full legal and political authority in decision making. It constitutes the 
highest authority, which coordinates the network of subordinated committees and 
working groups. The decisions of the Council are often based on the reports and 
recommendations of these committees. Each member state sends one represent-
ative to the NAC, which can convene at the level of permanent delegates, foreign, 
or defense ministers and at the level of prime ministers or presidents (heads of 
state). Decisions made are compulsory and bear full authority regardless of the 
level at which the decisions were made. The sessions are chaired by the Secretary 
General of NATO. The International Secretariat located at the NATO Headquarters 
supports the entire work of the NAC, under the direction of the Secretary General.3
2 Haglund. For the organizational structure, strategy, and activity of  NATO see details in: The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 1989; and Encyclopedia of NATO Topics, see further: De Velasco 
Vallejo 2002, 505–520. For a general history of NATO see: Zorgbibe 2002; Kaplan 2004; Risso 
2014; Manuel de l’OTAN. Chronologie, 1999. See also the following volumes: The Atlantic Pact 
Forty Years Later, 1991; A History of NATO. The First Fifty Years, 2001.
3 The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 1989. 321–328. See also the website of NA: http://archi-
ves.nato.int/north-atlantic-council-2 [Accessed: August 2, 2018]
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The Political Committee of NATO also supports the activity of the NAC. The 
members of this forum are the permanent representatives or political experts of 
the member states’ delegations. Besides the regular exchange of information and 
discussion of problems, the Political Committee prepares reports requested by the 
Council. Its sessions are chaired by the Deputy Secretary General responsible for 
political affairs.
Further forums of consultation are the ad hoc committees dealing with special 
topics and the discussions of the experts sent by the member states and regions, 
held twice a year (for details, see below). The material for working papers and 
reports is provided by the delegations of the member states, while the editing and 
coordinating activity is supervised by the Political Affairs Division of the International 
Staff. 
The Political Directorate operating within this division provides the administra-
tive basis for all political activity of NATO. Its sphere of influence includes political 
aspects of East–West relations, world events concerning non-member states, the 
observation of European political processes, and negotiations on arms reduction.4
The Activities and Situation of the North Atlantic Pact in 1988–1991
Celebrating in 1989 the fortieth anniversary of its establishment, NATO had to face 
serious challenges. A problem unresolved for a long time was the preponderance 
of the Soviet Bloc in conventional weapons. General John Galvin, the Commander 
in Chief of the European Forces of NATO, pointed out in 1989 that Soviet tank 
and artillery production had steadily increased since March 1985, when Mikhail 
Gorbachev came to power. The declarations on arms reduction in December 1988 
effected only modest changes in this situation. Among the leaders of NATO coun-
tries, uncertainty prevailed regarding Soviet goals. (Kaplan 2004, 104)
Another problem, which had been unresolved for decades, was the uneven dis-
tribution of the cost of defense within NATO. The cost of common defense was pri-
marily borne by the US budget despite the fact that European economies, having 
overcome the crisis caused by WWII, showed better economic performance year by 
year. This problem caused tensions in US government circles from the 1960s on. 
The presumption of US politicians that the growing European Communities had huge 
unexploited resources for purposes of defense exacerbated the situation further at 
the end of the 1980s. (Kaplan 2004, 50-51, 104) On the other hand, there had for a 
long time been efforts to increase the independence of Europe from the US.
But sudden and radical transformation of East–West relations and the prob-
lems related to Eastern Europe exceeded the above mentioned problems in sig-
nificance. This was considered the main challenge at the end of the 1980s. The 
bipolar world system dominated by the US and the Soviet Union ceased to exist 
by 1991: the Soviet Union gradually retreated, first militarily, than politically from 
the region, the East European communist regimes collapsed, and Germany unit-
ed. Thus, the eastern safety zone of NATO transformed radically. The competing 
alliance system, the Warsaw Pact, eroded, then ceased to exist by July 1991. The 
Soviet Union even disintegrated by the end of that year. The destabilization of an 
4 The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 1989, 191–192, 330.
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Eastern Europe that had been immobile for decades, the revival of suppressed 
nationalisms,5 the mass movements generated by social crises, and conflicts within 
some states of the region posed a persistent threat in the view of the leading circles 
of NATO.6 The character of the transformation and its fast pace surprised observ-
ers who were unable to clearly foresee the further development of the region of the 
Soviet bloc.7 The US ambassador to NATO shared his doubts with his colleagues 
with the following words: “we do know nothing sure about the future direction of re-
forms in the Soviet Union. Are Moscow and his allies heading toward the establish-
ment of stable political systems? The situation is in fact fluid and unpredictable”.8
It is important to emphasize that archival documents now accessible to research-
ers, interviews with political decision makers, and diplomatic memoirs agree that 
the US and its western allies experienced the democratic transformation of Eastern 
Europe and the loosening control of the USSR over the region with a growing fear 
of the modification of the decades long relative equilibrium. The direction of chang-
es, which were welcomed in accord with their liberal stance and values, were to 
be accepted only if they happened gradually, with the maintenance of the ruling 
reform communist elite in power and in parallel with the maximum acceptance of 
Moscow’s desires in security questions. Numerous messages urging caution and 
deceleration were sent to both the opposition and the government forces in the So-
viet bloc. Following the traditions of European power politics, stability was valued 
more than the desires of the small nations for emancipation.9
Henning Wegener, Deputy Secretary General of NATO, stated in his public 
speech in the fall of 1989 that the Warsaw Pact… could well perform useful fun-
ctions and enhance stability if reformed on the basis of strict equality.10 Half a 
year later, in February 1990, the spokesman of the alliance replied to the idea of 
Gyula Horn, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that Hungary could become a 
5 Experts convening to elaborate the 1988 April report (C-M(88)14) on Eastern Europe completely 
agreed that “the ethnic question / question of nationality in its globality” is the most important issue to 
resolve for Gorbachev. AMAE: Série Europe 1986–1990, 1935INVA, carton 5882. Note de Bernard 
Fassier, chef de la Section URSS à la Sous-Direction d’Europe oriental, Réunion du groupe d’experts 
„URSS et Pays de l’Est” de l’OTAN, à Evère les 23, 24 et 25 mars 1988, 995/EU (March 29, 1988).
6 For the latter the evolving conflict between Hungary and Romania is a good example regarding the 
increasing oppression of the Hungarian minority in Romania, or the tension between Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia regarding the power plant in Gabčikovo and Nagymaros. For the impact of this in 
1989, see Békés 2012, 337-341.
7 The notes of Michael Alexander, the permanent representative of the UK in the NATO Council, to 
Douglas Richard Hurd, Foreign Secretary of the UK. Revolution of 1989: how should the alliance 
respond? (January 4, 1990) See: Britain in the NATO, 2009, 144–145.  
8 AMAE: Série Europe 1986–1990, 1935INVA, carton 5882. Rapport du représentant permanent de 
la France au Conseil de l’Atlantique Nord au ministre des Affaires étrangères – Affaires Stratégiques 
et Désarmement, Rapports des groupes d’experts au Conseil, 597/STR (May 17, 1989).
9 The book of László Borhi (Borhi 2016) provides a thorough overview on the opinions and actions 
of the western powers. See Chapter 10. “1989: Together We Liberated Eastern Europe”, 364–
433. Read further: Békés 2002; Békés 2012, 330–362; Békés 2016; Békés–Kalmár 2019. The 
same conclusion: Blanton 2011. Regarding French relations see: Magyar−francia kapcsolatok, 
1945−1990, 2013, 125–145; Garadnai–Schreiber 2008.
10 NATO at Forty: New Visions of East-West Relations, 20 November 1989. MNL OL, Külügyminiszté-
rium (Hungarian State Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), NATO, 1989. XIX-J-1-j, 111. box. Cited 
by Borhi 2016, 369.
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member of the political organization of NATO, as follows: Any future political or 
military reorientation of Hungary is a question that should be left to the Hunga-
rians.  However, we are unaware of it arising as a serious question in Hungary. 
(Nem ez a kérdés van ma napirenden, 1990. Quoted by Pietsch 1998, 11, 57.)
Another challenge that NATO had to cope with was the deepening, strength-
ening, and broadening of European integration. With the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty in December 1991, the EU was born and demands for a common and in-
dependent European foreign and defense policy were interpreted by many as a 
demand for independence from the USA or from NATO. (Kaplan 2004, 113) The 
alliance also had to react to the Gulf Crisis.  It threatened the petroleum supplies 
of the member states and began with an attack of Iraqi troops on Kuwait on August 
2, 1990.
The Birth of a New Concept
In a study dealing with the adaptation to the new situation after the Cold War, Kori 
Schake emphasized that for its members NATO always had other functions besides 
averting the Soviet threat. It secured the possibility for Washington to intervene in 
European affairs, it made the Europeans more comfortable with the cooperation 
with increasingly powerful West Germany, and decreased the member countries’ 
defense costs. But these factors were difficult to demonstrate to the broader pub-
lic when it recognized the rapid decrease in the Soviet threat. Therefore, for the 
governments of the allied countries it became important to articulate new goals that 
could be communicated better. (Schake 2001, 31) And, in the decision making 
centers of the member states the opinion was gaining strength that, despite the 
positive direction of the East European changes, there was still need for military 
and security cooperation between the member states.  In other words, the NATO 
is necessary, but with a more flexible approach (Risso 2014, 142) and a new mis-
sion: instead of serving as a deterrent against the Soviet bloc, emphasis shifted 
to conflict prevention and crisis management. In this process the First Gulf War 
played a catalyzing role.
Though the war waged against Iraq in January–February 1991 was not led by 
NATO but by the US at the head of an international coalition, the participation of 
member states in the campaign exerted strong influence on the development of 
the alliance. Twelve member states out of sixteen participated in the war, and Great 
Britain and France even sent troops. (Kaplan 2004, 111-112) The session of the 
NAC on June 7, 1991 in Copenhagen pointed out in this connection that the long 
practice of cooperation, common procedures, collective defence arrangemen-
ts and infrastructure developed by NATO provided valuable assistance to those 
Allies that chose to make use of them. (Zorgbibe 2002, 185. See: Final Com-
muniqué, 1991.) The joint victory over Saddam Hussein contributed greatly to the 
unity and the future mission of NATO, namely organizing crisis management. At the 
meeting of NATO defense ministers in May 1991, plans for handling conflicts with 
smaller forces were negotiated and the plan for a multinational rapid reaction force 
also arose. (Kaplan 2004, 112-113)
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According to the New Strategic Concept accepted by the NATO summit held 
in Rome in November 1991, “Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from 
calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse 
consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social 
and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are 
faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe.” (The Alliance’s New Stra-
tegic Concept, 1991.) The new concept and tasks emerged more vigorously in the 
meeeting, as there were not only predictions of new threats coming from the area 
of the disintegrating Soviet Union, but the first concrete experiences: ethnic clash-
es on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The unsuccessful coup d’etat against 
Gorbachev was especially disturbing. Thus crisis management arose as a new task 
in view of the politically unconsolidated neighboring regions. NATO extended its 
routine monitoring to the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The formu-
lation of this new concept strengthened cooperation between the two pillars of the 
transatlantic alliance, North America and Europe. (Kaplan 2004, 114-116)
The Transformation of the Alliance and An Opening towards Eastern Europe
The emerging crisis management function of NATO became evident when the or-
ganization undertook to provide military assistance to the UN and the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The session of the Foreign Minis-
ters of the NAC held in Oslo on July 4, 1992 stated, in accord with the proposal of 
the Netherlands, that NATO member states were ready to support the activity of the 
CSCE in maintaining peace on a case-by-case basis in accordance with… [NA-
TO’s] own procedures” offering “alliance resources and expertise. The Brussels 
session of the NAC on December 17, 1992 extended the same offer to the UN, 
subject to the authority of the UN Security Council.11 The war beginning in Yugosla-
via in July 1991 offered an excellent opportunity for the practical application of the 
crisis management function of NATO. (Kaplan 2004, 116. See also Spohr 2012, 
53)
The foreign ministers of NATO countries already in their meeting at Turnburry 
(Scotland) on June 7–8, 1990 sent a message offering friendly relations to the 
Soviet Union and the other European countries. (Manuel de l’OTAN. Chronologie 
1999, 37) Soon the establishment of military and political relations with Eastern 
Europe got underway. With regard to military affairs, the NATO council stated at its 
July 1990 session in London: We are ready to intensify military contacts, inclu-
ding those of NATO military commanders with Moscow and other Central and 
Eastern European capitals.12 By increasing contacts, the military leaders of the 
alliance wanted to increase trust and the sense of community. Another goal was to 
promote the establishment of civilian control over the forces of the Warsaw Pact. 
(Schake 2001, 31)
To realize this in practice, a direct link was established between NATO institu-
tions and the general staffs of East European countries. In order to make the po-
11 Zorgbibe 2002, 191-192. Final communiqué, 1992a; Final communiqué, 1992b. For the relation 
between NATO and UN in historical perspective after the Cold War see Gardner 2001.
12 Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, 1990. The Verbatim Record of the London 
Summit (C-VR(90)36) has been published: 1990 Summit.
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litical and military elite well prepared and compatible with the Euroatlantic system, 
training courses were organized beginning in October 1991 for the military officers 
of the region. (Zorgbibe 2002, 189) Thus in the fall of 1991 special courses began 
in the NATO Defense College in Rome and the school of SHAPE in Oberammer-
gau. (Risso 2014, 151. Cites the article of Wörner 1991) Based on the proposal 
of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, German Foreign Minister, and James Baker, US Sec-
retary of State, on December 20, 1991 the North Atlantic Coordinating Council, 
NACC, was established in order to strengthen cooperation with the states of the 
former Soviet Bloc, creating an „interlocking network” to discuss any defense pol-
icy questions.
NATO also aspired to establish tight connections with Russia, in part because 
of the danger that nuclear weapons could fall into unauthorized hands. (Kaplan 
2004, 115–116. See also Schake 2001, 35‒36) The establishment of the NACC 
served to realize the “euroatlantic community from Vancouver to Vladivostok,” a 
concept favoured by Baker. (Zorgbibe 2002, 190) Moscow yielded and accepted 
that American forces should remain garrisoned in Europe, while Washington ac-
cepted that the security concept of NATO be broadened to take into consideration 
Russian interests. (Soutou 2001, 715) The first assembly of defense ministers of 
the countries participating in the NACC was held on April 1, 1992, and ten days 
later the Chiefs of the General Staffs established its Military Committee. The NACC 
also participated in the solution of practical questions, like sending food aid to 
Russian towns. The session on December 18, 1992 even dealt with the civil war 
in Tadjikistan. (Zorgbibe 2002, 190) However, the effective operation of the NACC 
was limited, because it was only a consultative forum without authority to make 
decisions, the number of participants was too high and, because of Soviet and 
Russian participation, concerns of restoration of the old regime in Moscow and 
Eastern Europe could not be discussed on their merits. (Valki 2002, 389)
The first significant event in this opening toward the East was the visit of Edu-
ard Shevardnadze, Soviet Foreign Minister, to NATO Headquarters in Brussels on 
December 19, 1989. By receiving him, the Alliance expressed its desire to play a 
crucial role in the support of the transformation process in Eastern Europe. (Risso 
2014, 141) The leaders of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were also invited 
to the London summit of the NAC on July 5–6, 1990, to come to NATO, not just to 
visit, but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will make it possible 
for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations in this historic period of 
change. (Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, 1990.) Wörner him-
self traveled to Moscow in July 1990, but in the next months he also visited Prague, 
Warsaw, and Budapest. NATO Headquarters received several high ranking East 
European politicians, first of all the foreign and defense ministers, later the prime 
ministers and heads of state (Risso 2014, 141) including Vacláv Havel and Lech 
Wałęsa. In June 1990 Géza Jeszenszky, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 
July and October 1991 József Antall, Prime Minister of Hungary, then Lajos Für, 
Minister of Defense, visited NATO Headquarters.13 The information service of the 
13 For the chronology of the visits of eastern European leaders at NATO Headquarters between De-
cember 1989 and 1991 see: Manuel de l’OTAN. Chronologie, 1999, 34-48.
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alliance put emphasis on the media effect of these visits.14 The Political Com-
mittee of NATO visited many former member states of the Warsaw Pact and gave 
advice regarding the ongoing political transformation. (Risso 2014, 141)
Among the countries belonging to the former, now disintegrating Soviet bloc, 
the GDR (united with West Germany in October, 1990) received special treatment. 
The Soviet Union agreed to reunited Germany’s full membership in NATO after 
a long negotiation. This agreement became one of the most important pillars of 
the contemporary European security system. US President Bush stated at the 
NATO summit in Brussels in December 1989 that he considered the fulfillment of 
the American demand for the approval of full membership to be one of the basic 
preconditions of German unification. (Soutou 2001, 716. On the so called “Two-
Plus-For” negotiation see also Westad 2017, 605‒607.) The NATO institutions also 
promoted the process of unification. The closing statement of the London NATO 
summit in July proposed that the members of the Warsaw Pact send envoys to the 
alliance and pledge their mutual non-aggression; it invited Gorbachev to the NATO 
assembly; and it expressed the willingness of the Alliance to revise its strategy by 
giving it a more defensive character. These gestures induced Gorbachev to accept 
the German unification as the Americans demanded, and made it easier for his 
internal opponents to accept it too.
Regarding the eastern enlargement of NATO, David J. Rösch has noted that the 
idea occurs in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty: The Parties may, by unani-
mous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the 
principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 
area to accede to this Treaty. (Rösch 2016, 60; The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949.)
Although in 1989–1991 official forums made no mention of the enlargement of 
NATO, recent studies show there were intensive talks about this question behind 
the scenes. (See Spohr 2012, cited by Risso 2014, 143.) During the debates, 
NATO officials came to the conclusion that it was in the interest of NATO that there 
be peace, security, and „good government” to the east.15 In an interview by László 
Borhi with Mark Palmer, the former US ambassador to Budapest mentioned that 
William Odom, the earlier Director of the National Security Agency, initiated a cam-
paign as early as 1990 to promote NATO membership for the countries of Eastern 
Europe. (Borhi 2015, 470) However, US National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft 
proposed prior to the final dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991 that NATO 
should negotiate separately with the member states of the East European alliance 
14 Risso 2014, 141. The same happened during the visit of Géza Jeszenszky on June 29, 1990, after 
which the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the General Secretary of NATO held a joint press 
conference, then gave exclusive interviews for the Belgian and Hungarian journalists. MNL OL: Kül-
ügyminisztérium, 001822/3/1990, VI–L//NATO. [National Archives of Hungary: Foreign Ministry]. 
Jelentés a Minisztertanácsnak Dr. Jeszenszky Géza külügyminiszter és Manfred Wörner NATO-fő-
titkár és Peter Corterier, az Észak-atlanti Közgyűlés főtitkára közötti megbeszélésekről [Report to 
the Council of Ministers on the talks between Dr. Géza Jeszenszky, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and 
Manfred Wörner, NATO Secretary General, and Peter Corterier, Secretary of the Northern Atlantic 
General Assembly] (July 5, 1990). Source: Iratok az Antall-kormány külpolitikájához és diplomáciá-
jához, 2015, 352.
15 Risso 2014, 151. See: The Situation in the Soviet Union, 1991. On the eastern enlargement of 
NATO see: Asmus 2002 and Grayson 1999. For Hungarian relations see Pietsch 1998; Valki 2002; 
Jeszenszky 2016.
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and (according to Philip David Zelikow, a former member of the National Security 
Council) this preceded the opening of NATO to the East and Central European 
states. (Sarotte 2009, 174) According to Ronald D. Asmus, US Deputy Secretary 
of State responsible for European affairs, the idea of the eastern enlargement of 
the alliance came from the former opposition politicians of the Soviet bloc who 
were to become leading politicians and diplomats. For them this step was a logical 
extension of their struggle against communism and the culmination of their 
fight for freedom, democracy, and national independence. (Asmus 2002, xxvi.) 
However, even the ruling politicians of the region raised the demand that the west-
ern alliance should provide security and defend the region from the weakening, but 
still militarily important Soviet Union.
The analysis of the situation of the Soviet Union and its allies in Central and 
Eastern Europe had a decades long tradition in NATO by 1988. (An excellent good 
work on NATO expertise regarding the Soviet Bloc: Hatzivassiliou 2014; see also 
Hatzivassiliou 2018.) The task of the Political Working Group, operating in London 
between March 1951 and March 1952 (besides the reorganization of NATO) was 
to provide information to the Council of Deputies. The latter held its sessions be-
tween those of the NAC, discussing such topics as the situation in the GDR and the 
Soviet Union and the relative military, political and economic potential and capacity 
of the Soviet Union compared to that of NATO. After this working group ceased to 
exist, the NAC had to bear responsibility for proper orientation on political topics.16
The Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy, established by decision of the 
North Atlantic Council of October 8, 195217 as an ad hoc group, prepared its re-
ports for the sessions of the foreign ministers of the NATO Council.18 Its activity was 
taken over in January 1957 by the Political Committee, which was formed originally 
as the Committee of Political Advisors following a proposal by the Committee of 
Three established for the reform of the alliance. There were five experts’ working 
groups belonging to the Committee of Political Advisors, among them the ones 
examining trends in Soviet politics and in the East European satellite states. In their 
reports they also dealt with East–West relations, the development of the states in 
the Soviet bloc, and their relation to the Soviet Union.19 In accordance with the 
general goals of NATO, the working group dealing with Eastern Europe was con-
sidered the most important one.20
In the elaboration of these analyses about the Soviet Union and the other states 
of the Soviet bloc a great role was played by the preliminary studies of the national 
diplomatic organs and the consultative discussions of the experts delegated by 
the individual states. In the spirit of the decision making principles of NATO, the 
purpose of these meetings was to develop a consensus. Most of the delegated 
16 The website of NA: http://archives.nato.int/political-working-group [Accessed: August 4, 2018]
17 NA: C-R(52)24, item 5.
18 The website of NA: http://archives.nato.int/working-group-on-trends-of-soviet-policy [Accessed: 
August 4, 2018]
19 The website of NA: http://archives.nato.int/political-committee [Accessed: August 4, 2018] Docu-
ments published in English from the series up to now: North Atlantic Council Document C-M(56)110, 
2002.
20 See also: NA: United Kingdom Delegation to the North Atlantic Council NATO/OTAN, Meetings of 
the NATO Experts, POL 4/13/1 (annex II to POLADS(70)46)(September 18, 1970). 
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were employees of the sections of their respective foreign ministries that dealt with 
Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union.21
For the period of the eight reports published in this volume, four documents 
may be found in the French Foreign Ministry Archives (AMAE) where the French 
delegates of the working groups report on the sessions. These documents shed 
light on the character of the debates and on the evaluation methods used in the 
experts’ reports. While the reports’ conclusions reflected a consensus, sharp dis-
agreements can be detected in the discussions. For instance, in the course of 
the meeting in March 1988 the West German expert forcefully requested that a 
statement from the British draft be removed from the final text according to which 
the Brezhnev doctrine was still valid in relations between the Soviet Union and the 
allied states, and that therefore Moscow might still intervene if some of the East Eu-
ropean communist regimes were threatened by sudden collapse. But the French 
delegation, supported by the Americans and British, spoke out against deleting 
those sentences.22 But there was general agreement with the statement during 
the April talks in 1990 that in the final analysis, Hungary is a nationalist country, 
where the removal of the prohibitions imposed by communism coercion makes 
it possible for ’chauvinism’ to reappear.23
Diplomatic representatives in the Soviet bloc from the very beginning of the Cold 
War often had to face with obstacles in obtaining valuable and reliable information 
on the relations between political leaders in the countries where they were sta-
tioned.24 This situation prevailed until the end of the 1980s, as demonstrated by 
a French document from the meeting of experts in March 1988. In order to over-
come these obstacles, and also to measure the internal support for Gorbachev 
among Soviet party leaders, the French delegates proposed a peculiar method. 
They defined „concentric zones” with the first circle for those questions on which 
all significant leaders agreed (for instance, the necessity of deep structural reforms 
in the economy and society), and continuing with the next zone, where opinions 
were less likely to coincide (as in the differing content of „democratization”), fi-
nally ending with the most debated questions in the outermost zone. This meth-
od reflected deviations in opinion regarding the limits of reforms or their speed. 
According to the French report, this method of evaluation aroused great interest, 
and it strengthened the general view that Gorbachev’s influence had significantly 
21 AMAE: Série Europe 1971–1976, 1928INVA, carton 2901. Secretary of Political Committee, signed 
M. J. Jordan to Expert Working Group on the USSR and Eastern Europe (through members of the 
Political Committee), Meeting of 2nd – 5th May, 1972, MJ/72/35 (April 27, 1972). 
22 AMAE: Série Europe 1986–1990, 1935INVA, carton 5882, Note de Jacques Faure, chef de la 
Section Pays de l’Est à la Sous-Direction d’Europe orientale, Réunion du groupe d’experts „Pays de 
l’Est” à l’OTAN, les 24 et 25 mars 1988, 993/EU (March 30, 1988). 
23 AMAE: Série Europe 1986–1990, 1935INVA, carton 5882, Note de Christine Toudic, Sous-Direc-
tion d’Europe Orientale et Centrale, Compte-rendu de la réunion du groupe d’experts „pays de l’Est” 
de l’OTAN (9–11 avril 1990), 1118/EU (April 19, 1990).
24 See NA: Note du secrétaire général de la Commission permanente du Traité de Bruxelles, Situa-
tion des missions occidentales dans les pays au delà du rideau de fer, A/1111 (définitif) (March 27, 
1951). Also: AMAE: Europe, 1944-1970, Généralités, 248QO, dossier 80. Note de la Sous-Direc-
tion d’Europe orientale, Attaques des pays de démocraties populaires contre la France (February 
13, 1954).
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increased since his accession to power in 1985.25
The documents published in this volume reveal how the situation in the Soviet 
bloc was evaluated by the foreign ministries of the NATO powers in 1988–1991 
on the basis of their internal documentation, the consultations in NATO and among 
each of the foreign ministries, and other sources. But it should be emphasized that 
the NATO states that played a key role in the elaboration of these reports, that is, 
the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany, did not share all available 
information with their allies. They prepared summaries for the ministerial sessions 
of the North Atlantic Council, which occurred twice a year. These documents, 
which review the previous six months of the Soviet bloc, constitute an excellent 
source for the views about Eastern Europe held in the important decision making 
centers of NATO in a given period.
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